Differentiated Integration and the Nordic States: the Case of Norway by Leruth, Benjamin
asdfasdfas
 
 
Differentiated Integration and 
the Nordic States: the Case of 
Norway  
 
ISL WORKING PAPER 
2013:2 
 
Department of Political Science and Management 
University of Agder 
 
ISSN 1893-2347 
 
Benjamin Leruth  
 
 2 
 
 
 
Differentiated Integration and the Nordic States: the 
Case of Norway 
Benjamin Leruth, University of Edinburgh / ARENA Centre for European Studies 
 
Paper to be presented at the European Integration Summer School, University of Agder,  
5 August 2013 
 
Abstract 
Since the early 1990s, the relationship between Norway and the European Union EU became 
increasingly complex and accounts for about three quarters of the European legislation. Despite 
the outcome of the 1994 referendum on EU membership, the various Norwegian governments 
progressively decided to keep on deepening their cooperation with Brussels. The main objectives 
of this paper are to describe this complex Norway-EU relationship, how it evolved since the early 
1990s, and how it constitutes a relevant example of both internal and external differentiated 
integration. An overview of the different types of differentiated integration and the evolution of 
its categorisation are firstly given. The range of agreements between Norway and the EU is 
analysed per policy areas. In order to explain why Norwegian governments adopted specific 
positions regarding European integration since the early 1990s, some explanatory factors are then 
briefly outlined. Finally, it is concluded that as full EU membership does not seem to be a 
politically viable option in Norway for the past decades, differentiated integration is likely to 
remain central in the long run. 
_____ 
 
Studies on regionalism tend to focus on explaining why states seek membership within a 
regional organisation (see e.g. Baldwin 1994; Laursen 2003). In the case of European Union [EU] 
integration, several competing theories have been put forward to explain the position of national 
political elites. Until recently, however, the literature on EU integration has mostly emphasised 
elite views on enlargement (see, inter alia, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). But the diverse 
responses regarding agreements between states and the European Union which occurred in the 
1990s has made the membership / non-membership dichotomy obsolete for fully understanding 
the relationship between states and the EU.  
Accordingly, there seems to be a lack of analysis on other forms of European integration, 
which are covered by the notion of “differentiated integration” (Holzinger and Schimmelfennig, 
2012) and the authors further state that “empirical analysis has been limited to a few important 
cases of treaty law (such as the Economic and Monetary Union] and Schengen), but there are no 
comprehensive data sets” (p. 293). An explanation for this gap in the literature is the fact that 
until the early 1990s and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, discussions on differentiated 
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integration were limited, despite the fact that Jean Monnet himself reflected on this idea (Stubb, 
1996).  
The Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) constitute 
illuminating examples for the study of differentiated integration, as their party systems are 
considered to be made up of a relatively homogenous political block, the so-called ‘Nordic 
political model’ (Hilson, 2008) or ‘Nordic Model of Government’ (Arter, 2006; 2008), but 
nevertheless each Nordic state decided to change its relations and relationships with the EU 
institutions at a different pace. There is thus a strong divergence in terms of the ‘differentiated 
integration’ advocated by the different Nordic governments. At the time of writing, three of the 
five states are members of the EU: while Finland (which joined in 1995) is considered as being 
close to the core of EU activity (Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005), Sweden (1995), on the other hand, 
is considered an “Euro-outsider” (Lindahl and Naurin, 2005) whereas Denmark (1973) has opted 
out of three core EU policies (Economic and Monetary Union EMU, Common Foreign and 
Security Policy [CFSP], as well as Justice and Home Affairs [JHA]) through the Edinburgh 
Agreement, having operated one of the most visible and institutional forms of differentiation in 
the European Union (Miles, 2010). The two remaining states - Iceland and Norway - are part of 
the European Economic Area [EEA] and the Schengen area but currently remain outside of the 
European Union. However, following the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland applied for EU 
membership for the first time in its history. Since December 2012, negotiations between the 
Icelandic authorities and the European Union are de facto put on ice. Norway, however, has no 
current prospect of joining the European ‘club’, despite four previous applications and various 
(in)formal agreements with Brussels. As emphasised by Egeberg and Trondal (1999, p. 134), 
Norway may be “even more sectorally penetrated or harmonized” than other EU members as far 
as policy harmonization is concerned, meaning that non-membership may still involve a great 
deal of integration. Rieker (2006, p. 284) even views Norway as a “class B member of the EU – a 
country that is well integrated into most policy areas, but lacking real political influence”.  
Based on 20 in-depth interviews with Norwegian political elites and on official documents from 
political parties and governments from the early 1990s onwards, this paper examines Norway’s 
agreements with the European Union and demonstrates why the Norwegian case is a good 
example illustrating differentiated integration. It is divided into four sections. The first one gives 
an overview of the different types of differentiated integration and the evolution of its 
categorisation. The second one, which constitutes the core of this article, analyses the relationship 
between Norway and the European Union, and maps the different types of agreements between 
the two parties. The third one briefly outlines factors that potentially shaped governmental 
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positions regarding European integration. Finally, in the fourth section, it is concluded that as full 
EU membership does not seem to be a politically viable option in Norway for the past decades, 
the use of differentiated integration is likely to remain central in the long run.  
1. Categorising Differentiated Integration: from 30 models to the horizontal-vertical 
dichotomy 
Alongside defining the notion itself, several attempts to offer a typology of differentiated 
integration were presented in the literature over the past twenty years. Stubb (1996) lists about 30 
models and also classifies differentiated integration into three categories linked to general 
concepts of European integration: “time” (or “temporal differentiation”), with multi-speed 
Europe as main concept1 ; “space” (or “territorial differentiation”), with “Variable Geometry 
Europe” as the main concept2; and “matter” (or “sectoral differentiation”), with “A La Carte 
Europe” as main concept3. 
Holzinger and Schimmelfennig (2012) criticised this classification, underlining, inter alia, 
the fact that differentiation always has territorial and sectoral impacts, and that purely functional 
conceptions are not included in this categorisation. As an alternative to Stubb’s work, they offer a 
categorisation into six dimensions: 
 Permanent v. temporary differentiation; 
 Territorial v. purely functional differentiation; 
 Differentiation across nation states v. multi-level differentiation; 
 Differentiation takes place within the EU treaties v. outside the EU treaties; 
 Decision-making at EU level v. at regime level (i.e. intergovernmental decisions); 
 Only for member states v. also for non-member states/areas outside the EU territory.  
 
The authors also underline that empirical examples can be found for almost all models, 
suggesting that “differentiated integration comes in an astonishing variety of forms and … the 
concepts of differentiated integration can and should be used systematically to describe these 
forms and their frequency” (ibid., p. 297). The categorisation offered by the authors provides a 
                                                        
1 Stubb (1996, p. 285) defines this concept as a “mode of differentiated integration according to which the pursuit of 
common objectives is driven by a group of Member States which are both able and willing to go further, the 
underlying assumption being that the others will follow later”. 
2 “Mode of differentiated integration which admits to unattainable differences within the integrative structure by 
allowing permanent or irreversible separation between a hard core and lesser developed integrative units” (ibid.). 
3 “Mode of differentiated integration whereby respective Member States are able to pick-and-choose, as from a 
menu, in which policy they would like to participate, whilst at the same time holding only to a minimum number of 
common objectives” (ibid.). 
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meticulous way of analysing differentiated integration, which reflects the complex reality of 
European integration, as shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Holzinger and Schimmelfennig’s categorisation of differentiated integration 
Dimension  
1 Temporary Permanent 
2 Territorial Functional 
3 Differentiation at nation-state level Multi-level differentiation 
4 Only inside EU treaties Also outside EU treaties Only inside Also outside EU treaties 
5 EU decision-making Club decision-making (intergovernmental) 
6 Only member states Also non-
members 
Only 
members 
Also non-member states Only 
members 
Also jurisdictions outside 
EU 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Models Multiple 
Speed 
Multiple 
Standards 
Avantgarde 
Europe 
Core 
Europe, 
Concentric 
Circles 
Flexible 
integration 
Variable 
Geometry 
Europe à la 
carte 
Optimal 
Level of 
Jurisdiction 
Flexible Co-
operation 
FOCJ 
Examples Many in 
secondary 
law 
In secondary 
law, e.g. 
environmental 
policy 
EMU, basic 
rights charta 
EMU, EEA, 
associated 
states 
Enhanced 
co-operation, 
Bologna (at 
the start) 
Schengen Bologna Competence 
allocation in 
Lisbon 
Treaty 
EUREGIOS No example 
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The most recent attempt at categorising DI was made by Leuffen et al (2013), who also see the 
European Union as a system of differentiated integration, i.e. “one Europe with an organizational and member 
state core but with a level of centralization and territorial extension that vary by function” (p. 10). Basing their 
study on primary law, they start from the assumption that “the EU potentially covers the entire range of 
policies, but that each policy varies with regard to the level of centralization and the territorial extension” 
(p. 12). They determine that differentiated integration is composed of two main categories: the variation in 
the level of centralisation across policies (or “vertical differentiation”), and the variation in territorial 
extension across policies (or “horizontal differentiation”) 4 . Furthermore, they classify horizontal 
differentiation into four sub-categories: 
1) No horizontal differentiation: all EU rules apply uniformly to all EU member states. This was the case 
until the early 1990s, before differentiated integration was implemented through the Maastricht 
Treaty; 
2) External differentiation: EU rules apply uniformly to all EU member states, but non-member states 
can also adopt these rules. The European Economic Area illustrates this type of horizontal 
differentiation: all EU member states are members of the EEA, such as three non-members, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
3) Internal differentiation: EU rules do not apply uniformly to all EU member states. For instance, this 
type of horizontal differentiation applies when EU member states decide to opt out from 
membership in a policy area. This is the case of Denmark (through the Edinburgh Agreement), 
the United Kingdom (who opted out from several policies through the Maastricht Treaty) and 
Sweden (who has not joined the EMU). Another example of internal differentiation is the 
enhanced cooperation procedure, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and allowing at least 
one third of the EU member states to adopt a policy within the EU framework, without affecting 
states that are not willing to cooperate.  
4) Internal and external differentiation: EU rules from which some EU member states opted out, while 
non-member states opted in. An example of internal and external differentiation is the Schengen 
agreement: while Ireland and the United Kingdom opted out from this policy, four non-EU 
members (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) opted in.  
 
In order to avoid semantic confusion and to understand differentiated integration within 
the context of this paper, Leuffen et al’s conceptualisation is retained. The emphasis is here put 
on horizontal differentiation. As Norway is a non-EU member who opted into several EU 
                                                        
4
 While categorising the European Union as a “system of differentiated integration”, Leuffen et al (2013, p. 12) start 
from the assumption that “the EU potentially covers the entire range of policies, but that each policy varies with 
regard to the level of centralization and the territorial extension”. 
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policies, the relationship between this country and the European Union shows signs of both 
internal and external differentiation.  
Figure 1. Types of horizontal differentiation over time5 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the evolution of horizontal differentiation over time. While member 
states uniformly applied EU rules until the 1980s, less than half of EU policies still show no signs 
of differentiation in 2010. One can observe a strong increase in external differentiation, which 
can mostly be explained by the fact that non-EU member states (including Norway) joined the 
Single Market in the early 1990s through the European Economic Area.  
Now that differentiated integration has been contextualised within the framework of this 
paper, the following section will demonstrate how Norway is a relevant example of both internal 
and external differentiation.  
2. Norway and the European Union: a complex relationship 
The relationship between Norway and the European Union has constantly evolved over 
time, especially since the early 1990s. Associations between those two parties take place largely 
through the EEA agreement, which constitutes a meta-agreement between Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and the EU. This agreement covers about three quarters of the European 
legislation and grants parties access to the European Single Market. Egeberg and Trondal (1999, 
p. 134) even argue that “the non-member EEA countries are integrated to the same extent as full 
members are as far as policy harmonization is concerned”. However, the reality is more complex. 
Indeed, Norway cooperates with the European Union in many areas that are not covered by the 
EEA agreement. The aim of this section is to demonstrate Norway’s deep connection with the 
EU by analysing agreements that go beyond the EEA, from the early 1990s to 2011. A brief 
                                                        
5 Based on Leuffen et al, 2013. Analysis based on the 18 policy areas covered in European integration. 
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review of the European Economic Area is firstly given. In order to provide a better 
understanding of the situation, agreements that are not falling within the scope of the EEA are 
classified into five categories: the Economic and Monetary Union [EMU], Trade, Agriculture and 
Fisheries, Foreign and Security policies, and Justice and Home Affairs [JHA].  
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Figure 2. Map of the agreements between Norway and the European Union (in 2011) 
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Figure 2 shows the complexity of the relationship Norway has with the EU outside the EEA 
agreement. While the EMU does not fall within the scope of any agreements, the Norwegian 
authorities decided to take part to other policies not covered within the scope of the EEA. These 
agreements are developed below. 
2.1. The EEA agreement: a big step towards more integration 
In April 1984, closer cooperation between the EFTA members and the European 
Economic Community [EEC] was set up with the Luxembourg Declaration (Lazowski, 2006). 
The notion of ‘Espace économique européen’ was discussed within the framework of this 
Declaration, building the premises of the future EEA. This project was characterised as 
“dynamic” and “homogeneous”, meaning that “the same legal rules should apply in all the 
participating countries and that the EES should develop in step with the Community” (Gstöhl, 
2002, p. 149). The ratification of the Single European Act in 1986 pushed non-EEC countries for 
closer co-operation on economic issues.  
On 17 January 1989, President of the European Commission Jacques Delors presented his work 
plan for the newly appointed Commission to the European Parliament, setting up the future of 
EFTA-EEC relations as one of the top priorities on the agenda (Lazowski, 2006). Delors’ goal, 
commonly known as the “1992 project”, was to extend the four freedoms (goods, services, 
capital and mobility) to EFTA Member States (Emerson et al, 2002). In other words, this would 
mean extending the Single European Market to EFTA members. This proposition was warmly 
welcomed by the EFTA countries and negotiations officially started on 20 June 1990 (Lazowski, 
2006).  
Negotiating the EEA was extremely difficult for the EFTA countries, as it meant giving up a 
bigger part of their sovereignty. However, after long discussions and tensions, the different 
parties accepted a final version of the EEA agreement in February 1992. In October, 130 MPs 
voted in favour and 35 against the agreement. Membership of the EEA was seen as a step closer 
to EC membership by the leading Labour Party, and had clear benefits for the country by 
opening up the EC market for its exports. Furthermore, as mentioned by Archer (2005, p. 57), 
“[i]t seems that the Labour leadership had originally hoped that the EEA would be brought from 
1 January 1993 and, after a few years of ‘socialization’ in the single market the public would come 
more easily to accept full membership of [...] the EU”.  
As mentioned above, the current EEA legislation covers about three quarters of the EU 
legislation. As of 2010, a total of 4182 legislative acts apply to Norway through the EEA, which 
demonstrates the complexity and the diversity of the agreement. However, several core policy 
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areas do not fall within the scope of the EEA agreement. The aim of the next sub-section is to 
analyse the relationship between Norway and the European Union in those specific areas. 
2.2. Agreements in areas not included in the EEA 
 As shown in Figure 2, five policy areas fall outside the scope of the EEA agreement: 
Foreign and Security policies, Justice and Home Affairs, Trade, Agriculture and Fisheries, and the 
Economic and Monetary Union. In the case of former four areas, Norway has bilateral 
agreements with the European Union, which lead the country to be partially integrated in policies 
for which both parties have common objectives. The latter area, the EMU, is completely 
detached from the figure as Norway remains outside of the European Union. However, as 
Norway is a small open economy and 70 percent of its foreign trade is with members of the 
European Union, formal regular contacts exist between the European Central Bank and the 
Norwegian Central Bank (Norges Bank). These contacts are mostly arranged in order to ensure 
the macroeconomic stability and regulate inflation.   
Foreign and Security policies 
 Norway’s international cooperation in the field of security dates from the creation of 
NATO in 1949. In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War and Norway’s geographical position 
implied a redefinition of the international security policies for the country. While an Atlantic 
cooperation through NATO and close links with the United States were considered as the 
priorities in terms of foreign security policy, the emergence of a European Security and Defence 
Policy jeopardised the future role of NATO in Europe. Furthermore, since US commitment to 
the defence of Europe was questioned at the end of the Cold War, there were increasing 
concerns on being marginalised at the international level (Archer, 2005). As a result, Norway’s 
political elites started to redefine their security policies and to progressively align themselves with 
the European Union. The first step towards integration in the European Security and Defence 
Policy took place in 1992, when Norway was invited to become an associate member of the 
Western European Union [WEU]. At that time, the relationship between the WEU and the 
upcoming European Union was still to be determined, but membership to this body was seen as 
a step in the right direction by Norwegian decision makers: this decreases the fear of 
marginalisation, without undermining Norway’s top priority in terms of security (NATO) and 
without touching upon the sensitive issue of national sovereignty (Rieker, 2006). Furthermore, 
associate membership in the WEU allowed Norwegian authorities to represent their own 
interests in terms of security, as well as to have access to information on developments within the 
future CFSP. For all these reasons, Norway’s relationship to the WEU was not contested by the 
most anti-EC parties represented in the Norwegian Parliament. 
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Studies on the EU referendum of November 1994 showed that security issues were considered as 
one of the most prevalent arguments for those who voted in favour of EU membership 
(Pettersen et al, 1996), but this did not constitute a decisive argument to tip the scales. However, 
following this rejection of EU membership, political elites kept on calling for closer cooperation 
with the EU in terms of security while retaining membership in the WEU as this institution was 
seen as a bridge between NATO and the EU. Accordingly, in 1995, Norway declared some of its 
forces available to the WEU for the Petersberg tasks, which cover various actions such as of 
crisis management, peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue actions. Furthermore, cooperation 
between the WEU and NATO was extended in 1996: under the Berlin Agreement, NATO 
provided the creation of a “European Security and Defence Identity” within its structure, which 
is commonly seen as “NATO’s European Pillar” (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012, p. 728).  
In 1996-1997, further discussions on the integration of the WEU within the institutions of the 
European Union led to some controversy, as the Norwegian authorities wanted the WEU to 
remain independent in order to keep its role of bridge between the EU and NATO. It was finally 
decided to implement the Petersberg tasks within the Amsterdam Treaty, following an initiative 
from the Finnish and Swedish authorities. These tasks formed the basis of the Common Security 
and Defence Policy [CSDP], which replaced the former European Security and Defence Policy. 
Moreover, the Berlin Agreement was revised in 2002 under the name of “Berlin Plus”. Based on 
conclusions of NATO’s Washington summit in 1999, this new agreement clarified the 
relationship between NATO and the European Union, allowing the latter to draw on NATO 
owned military assets by engaging in crisis management and conducting its own peacekeeping 
operations (Reichard, 2006). As a result of those institutional changes, responsibilities and 
institutions of the WEU were progressively transferred to the European Union, eventually 
sweeping away the raison d’être of the Western European Union. In consequence, relations 
between Norway and the European Union in new policies covered by the CSDP had to be 
amended.  
In 2001, Norway signed a bilateral agreement on support to the Council Joint Action 
2001/555/CFSP6 on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre [EUSC] as an EU 
agency, replacing the former Western Union Satellite Centre. Norway is considered as a third 
state in the sense of Article 2.3 of the Joint Action, and is thus entitled to be involved in the 
Centre’s activities.  
Through the Berlin Plus Agreement, the European Union is capable of conducting its own 
peacekeeping operations and crisis management policies, even if NATO refuses to act. As a 
                                                        
6
 Amended by Council Joint Action 2006/998/CFSP. 
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NATO and WEU member (before its dissolution), Norway had the opportunity to take part to 
these policies and actions.  The first EU-led military operation, named “Concordia”, took place 
in 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and saw the involvement of Norwegian 
troops. One year later, the EU started the operation “Althea”, which took over NATO’s SFOR 
operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in which Norway contributed until 2008. Following those 
two participations in EU peacekeeping operations, a general framework agreement was signed in 
2004, which establishes criteria for future participation in military and civilian operations. The 
same year, Norway reinforced its cooperation with the EU by signing an agreement on security 
procedures for the exchange of classified information. In total, as of 2011, Norway took part to 
three military, seven civilians and two peace monitoring operations headed by the European 
Union (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012).  
 The progressive implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy in the 
European Union also implied a dilemma for the Norwegian authorities: should Norway fully take 
part to the CSDP, or should bilateral agreements on specific policies be the norm? The debate re-
emerged when Norway was invited by the European Union to take part to the European 
Defence Agency [EDA] 7 . While the authorities showed strong interest in becoming a full 
member, “there was considerable disappointment when Norway failed to achieve full 
membership in the EU’s new defence agency” (Sjursen, 2012, p. 4). In 2006, as an alternative to 
full membership, Norway and the EDA concluded an Administrative Arrangement entailing 
Oslo to take part to some Agency’s activities and regimes, such as Research and Technology 
projects and the regime on Defence Procurement.  
 In 2005, the Norwegian authorities also voted in favour of full participation in EU Battle 
Groups, and more specifically in the Nordic Battle Group [NBG]. This agreement between 
Norway and the European Union stands out from the others as it gives Norway “the right” to 
participate. Furthermore, participation in the NBG was mostly seen as a step in the right 
direction by political elites, as it constitutes an important contribution to Nordic cooperation and 
is supported by the United Nations (Sjursen, 2012).  
 Finally, the last foreign and security policy in which Norway is involved deals with 
economic sanctions. Indeed, in recent years, Norway aligned itself on sanctions decided by the 
European Union, even though this issue was historically avoided by the Norwegian governments, 
which generally considered that sanctions must be based on the decisions of the Security Council 
of the United Nations (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012). In 2001, the Storting voted in favour 
of the so-called “Sanction Act”, allowing Norway to align on economic sanctions against third-
                                                        
7 The European Defence Agency was established by the Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004. 
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party States8. It was argued that this Act was a logical step towards more coherence with the 
CFSP. However, democratic concerns were raised in the Parliament, as economic sanctions 
decided by the European Union might not be officially translated in Norwegian (which is not an 
official language of the EU) and as this Act could avoid public debate that would normally 
precede adoption of such a decision. In response to those criticisms, the majority stated that the 
Sanction Act will not be used as a proxy law, except if emergency is needed in cases where the 
impact of the sanctions could be weakened over time.  Since the adoption of this Act in 2001, 
Norway aligned itself on European decisions seven times: against Burma (2003), Belarus (2006), 
Iran (2007, sanctions expanded in 2011), Syria (2011, expanded in 2012) and Libya (2011).   
Justice and Home Affairs 
 While foreign and security policies constitute a very complex area in terms of agreements 
between Norway and the European Union, the domain of Justice and Home Affairs also includes 
several sophisticated arrangements between the two parties. The biggest of these agreements is 
without any doubt the Schengen Agreement9.  
 Norwegian international cooperation in the area of Justice and Home Affairs dates from 
1958, with the introduction of the Nordic Passport Union. Considered as the ancestor of the 
Schengen Area, this Union between Denmark (including the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, 
Norway and Sweden removed internal border checks for citizens of these countries. In practice, 
this means that Nordic citizens can work and reside in any Nordic state without the need of a 
work and/or residence permit.  
Shortly after the ratification of the EEA agreement, and following the rejection of EU 
membership via referendum in 1994, the Norwegian authorities (jointly with Iceland) expressed 
their willingness to join the Schengen area, which was implemented in 1985 and was going to be 
enlarged to the three Nordic EU member States in 1996 (Denmark and the new 1995 members, 
Finland and Sweden). The main reason raised by Norway and Iceland to join the Schengen area 
was that it would secure the future of Nordic cooperation (Archer, 2005). However, Norway and 
Iceland’s non-membership in the European Union raised a legal issue, as Article 140(1) of the 
Schengen Convention stipulated that “[a]ny Member State of the European Communities may 
become a Party to this Convention”. Following political pressure from Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden who wanted to secure the future of Nordic cooperation, this article was amended and a 
bilateral agreement was found between Iceland and Norway on the one hand, and the European 
                                                        
8 In 1997, provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty gave the opportunity to the EU to adopt economic sanctions against 
third-party States. These sanctions are binding to Member States. For more information on economic sanctions, see 
Smith, 2001. 
9 It is important to remind that the Schengen Agreement was originally signed outside the EC legal framework. This 
agreement has been incorporated into European Union law under the Amsterdam Treaty (Leuffen et al, 2013)  
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authorities on the other hand. Norway and Iceland effectively opted into the Schengen 
agreement on 19 December 199610, jointly with the three other Nordic states. In 1999 under the 
Amsterdam Treaty, Schengen became a full part of the EU legislation under the “JHA pillar”: 
this led to a renegotiation of the bilateral agreement for the two non-member states, which was 
ratified by both national parliaments in the course of 1999. Finally, on 25 March 2001, the five 
Nordic states began full participation in the Schengen scheme. Within the framework of the 
Schengen agreement, Norway also participates in components such as the Schengen Information 
System [SIS] and the FRONTEX agency. 
The Schengen agreement is unique for Norway. Indeed, as a non-member of the European 
Union, the authorities do not have a say in the decision-making process of EU policies. However, 
under the Schengen Agreement, Norway and Iceland have access to EU decision-making 
structures and can influence decisions taken in this field. As explained by Archer (2005, p.187), 
“Norway is part of this system, with a voice but without a vote”.  
 Schengen does not constitute the only JHA policy in which Norway is fully integrated. 
Indeed, the position of Norwegian authorities on aspects related to freedom, security and justice 
are closely related, meaning that it was in the interest of Norway to extend its cooperation with 
the European Union in JHA policies that do not fall within the scopes of Schengen and of the 
EEA agreement. 
 Regarding police and judicial cooperation, Norway and the European Union signed a 
series of bilateral agreements on the recognition of several institutions. The first agreement deals 
with the European Police Office [EUROPOL], and was signed in 2001. Appearing under the 
Maastricht Treaty, EUROPOL became fully operational in 1999, and its main purpose is to fight 
against international organised crime. As EUROPOL is an EU agency, only member States of the 
European Union are formal members. However, in order to facilitate cooperation in the fight 
against organised crime, it seems logical to Norwegian authorities to sign a cooperation 
agreement on EUROPOL. The same happened in 2005 with the EU’s Judicial Cooperation Unit 
[EUROJUST], which is the EU agency established in 2002 and deals with judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. The fields covered by EUROJUST are mostly the fight against terrorism and 
criminal organisations, crime in a broader sense, fraud, corruption, money laundering and 
environmental crime (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012). Norway’s relation with EUROPOL 
and EUROJUST falls within the competence of the Ministry of Justice, and is formalised with 
the presence of permanent liaison officer and prosecutor in The Hague. Both EUROPOL and 
EUROJUST are considered as key agencies in the fight against international crime, and thus 
                                                        
10
 Whilst the national parliaments still had to vote on their countries’ participation to Schengen. 
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Norwegian cooperation was broadly accepted by the various political parties represented in the 
Norwegian Parliament (Archer, 2005).  
Norway also has an agreement with the European Union on police education. The European 
Police College [CEPOL], created in 2000 and established as an EU agency in 2005 by Council 
Decision 2005/681/JHA, aims at bringing together “senior police officers across Europe with 
the aim to encourage cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime and maintenance of 
public security and law and order” (CEPOL, 2012). The Norwegian Police Academy signed an 
agreement with CEPOL in 2006, and is considered as an associated member. In practice, this 
means that Norwegian police forces are allowed to take part to CEPOL courses, seminars and 
events (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012).  
 Several EU conventions falling within the scope of Justice and Home Affairs were also 
signed by the Norwegian authorities: the Dublin convention (replaced by the Dublin regulation 
in 2003), the Lugano and the Prüm conventions. The Dublin convention came into force in 1997 
and was ratified by Norway in 2001. The purpose covered by its extended version, the Dublin 
regulation signed in 2003, is to coordinate actions between States regarding applications for 
asylum seekers; the Lugano convention, implemented in Norwegian law in 2003 and 2009, deals 
with cooperation on judgements in civil and commercial matters; finally, the Prüm Convention 
(also named “Schengen III”) ratified in 2009 deals with the exchange of information between 
States to fight against terrorism. The latter Convention is the subject of a bilateral agreement 
signed in 2010 between Norway and the EU on certain provisions, but this agreement not yet 
entered into force by 2011.  
 In addition, Norway signed an agreement on the European Arrest Warrant [EAW]. This 
policy, which was signed in 2002 within the European Union following the terrorist attacks of 
New York in 2001, aimed at streamlining arrests and extraditions within the European Union. 
This framework replaced several provisions of the Schengen Convention. Whereas the 
Norwegian and Icelandic authorities considered that the EAW was a continuation of the 
Schengen agreements, the EU did not agree and negotiations on this issue started in 2002, to 
finally reach an agreement on the surrender procedure in 200611 (Norges offentlige utredinger, 
2012). In other words, the EAW agreement is not fully implemented in Norway, but the country 
participates in its surrender procedure. However, it should be noted that Nordic States cooperate 
on this issue through the Nordic Arrest Warrant, which has been implemented in 2007.   
 As demonstrated in this sub-section, as it is the case regarding foreign and security 
policies, Norway and the European Union have a complex relationship within the area of Justice 
                                                        
11 This agreement, however, was only ratified by the Norwegian Parliament in 2011. 
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and Home Affairs. Schengen constitute the biggest agreement in this field, especially since 
Norway takes part to the decision-making system. However, other agreements such as 
participation in EUROPOL and EUROJUST shall not be underestimated, as these demonstrate 
the willingness of both parties to cooperate on police and judicial grounds.  
Trade 
 As a non-member state of the European Union, Norway does not take part to the 
Customs Union. However, Norway is involved in European customs cooperation within the 
framework of the EEA agreement, under Protocols 10 and 11 (Norges offentlige utredinger, 
2012). The reason why Customs Union was not included in the EEA agreement was that this 
notion was considered as controversial among several negotiating states. However, Norway has 
some agreements on trade with the European Union through EFTA.  
The idea of creating a European Free Trade Association was suggested by Britain in July 
1956 as part of the negotiations on future trade relations between Western European countries 
within the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. The creation of a body less 
binding than the (then) European Economic Community was welcomed positively by the Nordic 
States (Ingebritsen, 1998). The Stockholm Convention, establishing EFTA, was signed in 1960 by 
seven countries12, including Norway. The free trade association excluded agriculture and most of 
fisheries out of its competences, but included Norwegian mackerel (Archer, 2005). In 1972/1973, 
following the first enlargement of the EEC13 and the negative result of a referendum in Norway 
on EEC accession, negotiations started between the remaining EFTA countries and the members 
of the European Community, in order to strengthen the links between the two associations 
(Lazowski, 2006). Following these negotiations, a series of bilateral trade agreements between the 
remaining EFTA countries (including Norway) and the EEC came into force in 1973 (EFTA, 
2010). These agreements, relatively similar in structure and contents, opened a new era in the 
relationship between the two associations by harmonising their trade relations in industrial and 
agricultural products.  
 In a nutshell, whereas the EEA agreement grants Norway an access to the European 
Single Market, the EFTA sets up rules for bilateral trade between the country and the European 
Union. Trade relations with third States is also set up by the EFTA Free Trade Relations. 
Agriculture and fisheries 
 Those two domains constitute an important part of the European project, through the 
Common Agricultural Policy [CAP] and the Common Fisheries Policy [CFP]. Due to the 
                                                        
12 The seven founding countries were : Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal. 
13 In 1972, Denmark, Britain and Ireland were able to join the EEC following a change in the French Presidency. 
For more information on the outcome of the Norwegian referendum, see Archer, 2005, pp. 45-47. 
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importance of agriculture and fisheries within national economies, these policies were not 
implemented within the EEA agreement 14  nor within EFTA. However, several bilateral 
agreements were signed between Norway and the European Union. Regarding fisheries, the 
following agreements stand (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012): 
 The Skagerrak Agreement, initially signed by Norway, Denmark and Sweden in 1966 and 
regarding fishing quotas in the Skagerrak and Kattegak straits, has been taken over by the 
European Commission; 
 Annual quotas agreements (“Agreed Minutes”) based on the bilateral agreement of 1980, 
dealing with common stocks in the North Sea, Norwegian fishing to the West of the 
British Isles, by Greenland and EU fishing in the Norwegian Economic Zone in the 
Barents Sea. Close cooperation on resource management has been gradually extended to 
new areas; 
 Agreement signed in 2000 on mutual satellite tracking; 
 Agreement signed in 2009 on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. 
Regarding agricultural policies, in the absence of a free trade agreement, several bilateral 
agreements are signed by both parties. Furthermore, Article 19(2) of the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area stipulates that “[t]he Contracting Parties undertake to continue their 
efforts with a view to achieving progressive liberalization of agricultural trade”. In other words, 
the EEA agreement aims at creating an agricultural free trade area. In this direction, a bilateral 
agreement in the form of an exchange of letters on additional trade preferences in agricultural 
products came into force in 2011 (Norway mission to the EU, 2011). Furthermore, Protocol 3 of 
the EEA agreement 15  regulates trade of processed agricultural products. To conclude, the 
domains of agriculture and fisheries mostly remain a national competence, but several trade 
agreements on specific (or regional) issues stand between Norway and the European Union.  
 As demonstrated in this section, Norway’s relation with the European Union is relatively 
complex. Besides being part of the EEA, Norway cooperates with the European Union in other 
key areas. A recent Norwegian report stated that Norway’s cooperation is more important than 
most citizens realise, and about three quarters of the European legislation has been implemented 
into national law as of 2011 (Norges offentlige utredinger, 2012). The non-member status of 
Norway means that they do not take part to the decision-making system (except in the case of 
Schengen, where the country has a ‘voice’ but no ‘vote’). Furthermore, within the framework of 
                                                        
14 However, it shall be noted that some provisions on veterinary and phytosanitary matters, presented in Annex 1 of 
the EEA agreement and implemented in 1998, regulate key factors in fisheries and agriculture. 
15 This Protocol does not apply to Liechtenstein, but to Iceland and Norway. 
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the EEA but also of bilateral agreements, Norway participates in several EU programmes and 
agencies. In a nutshell, despite not being a member of the European Union, Norway collaborates 
very closely with the EU as they share common interests in several areas, and this collaboration 
progressively evolved through a very complex system of relations, as demonstrated in Figure 2. 
In some policy areas (such as Justice and Home Affairs for instance), Norway is even more 
integrated than some EU member states, which opted out of specific policies. This whole 
Norway-EU relationship thus contains aspects of both internal and external differentiated 
integration.  
3. Why Differentiated Integration? 
The relationship between Norway and the European Union as a case of differentiated 
integration is a direct consequence of the 1994 referendum results, when the Norwegian 
population rejected full membership with a majority of 52.2 per cent voting against. However, 
this referendum does not explain why the Norwegian governments opted for such a close 
cooperation with Brussels, especially after 1994.  
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Table 2. List of Norwegian cabinets and their attitude towards European integration, 1989-2012 
Dates Cabinet Party/Parties Government’s share of 
MPs 
Attitude towards European integration, per policy areas 
EU 
membership 
EEA CFSP/
CSDP 
JHA CAP/
CFP 
EMU Trade 
16 October 1989 – 3 
November 1990 
Syse Conservative Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
Centre Party 
37% 
o o N/A N/A N/A N/A o 
3 November 1990 – 
25 October 1996 
Brundtland III 
and IV 
Labour Party 38% (1990) 
41% (1993) 
++ / o (post-
referendum) ++ - ++ ++ / o ++ / o + 
25 October 1996 – 17 
October 1997 
Jagland Labour Party 41% 
o ++ - ++ ++ / o ++ / o + 
17 October 1997 – 17 
March 2000 
Bondevik I Christian Democratic Party 
Centre Party 
Liberal Party 
25% 
-- ++ - + -- -- + 
17 March 2000 – 19 
October 2001 
Stoltenberg I Labour Party 39% 
- ++ - ++ - - + 
19 October 2001 – 17 
October 2005 
Bondevik II Conservative Party 
Christian Democratic Party 
Liberal Party 
37% 
-- ++ + ++ -- -- + 
17 October 2005 –    Stoltenberg II Labour Party 
Socialist Left Party 
Centre Party 
52% (2005)  
50% (2009) 
-- ++ + ++ -- -- + 
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Table 2 summarises the composition of governments and their positions regarding several 
aspects of European integration from the early 1990s (when debates over the EU membership 
started) to 2013. This table shows some variations in governmental positions regarding European 
issues, especially on foreign and security policies; nevertheless, in other policy areas as well as on 
EU membership, there seems to be some consistency in governmental positions following the 
referendum held in 1994. Nevertheless, the Norwegian political landscape has been strongly 
affected by the membership issue. For instance, in the early 1990s, the right-wing Syse cabinet 
(consisting of a coalition between the pro-EU Conservative Party and the Eurosceptic Christian 
Democratic and Centre parties) collapsed following discussions over the EEA agreement. 
Whereas the Centre Party defended the right for Norway to be exempted from EC regulations in 
order to favour Norwegian investors over foreign businessmen, this was rejected by the 
European Commission on the grounds that it would undermine the basis of the Single Market. 
As outlined by Archer (2005, p. 56): “[f]or the Centre Party, a foreign take-over of Norwegian 
resources was also unacceptable and a betrayal of national policies going back to the early days of 
independence”. The party then resigned from the government, which then fell from office. Since 
then and especially following the 1994 referendum, many governmental agreements included a 
‘suicide clause’ or ‘gag rules’ over the issue of EU membership (Fossum, 2010) in order to avoid 
such scenario to happen again. It can thus be argued that these clauses aim to improve 
government stability. 
This section briefly examines potential reasons that shaped governmental positions on 
differentiated European integration. Four variables have been selected within the framework of this 
paper: Nordic cooperation; corporatism; the composition of the Parliament; and the composition 
and type of government. Whereas some of those reasons have already been outlined in the 
literature, some others deserve more attention and could lead to further studies.  
Nordic cooperation: On many occasions, it has been proven that Nordic cooperation affects 
governmental positions on European integration. This is particularly the case in policies related to 
the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (Schengen) and defence (Nordic Battle Group): 
governmental positions on these policies were mostly driven by Norway’s relationship with its 
Nordic neighbours. This was also the case when the state applied for membership, following the 
examples of Sweden and Finland in order to avoid being “left behind” in the EEA agreement. 
Moreover, Nordic collaboration has been stated in all government declarations and constitutes 
the main priority of all parties in terms of international agreements, except in the case of the 
Conservative Party (Høyre), which prefers European integration above regional cooperation.  
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The importance of corporatism: According to Ingebritsen (1998, p. 10), a sectoral approach illustrates 
“how and why European integration mattered differently to each of the Nordic States”: for 
instance, Sweden joined the European Union because the capital-intensive manufacturing sector 
lobbied in favour of EU membership, while Norway did not join because its agriculture and 
fisheries would have been threatened by such a membership, and the oil sector guarantees 
Norway a future outside the EU. This sectoral analysis points up interesting insights in order to 
explain differentiated integration and variation in the Nordic states. However, several criticisms 
have been presented, inter alia, by Gstöhl (2005, p. 38), according to who “in Norway […] the 
interests tied to the most important industry, oil and gas, were inconsequential in the membership 
issue, while marginal sectors such as fishing and farming mattered”. Besides the issue of 
membership, it can be expected that economic sectors lobby to shape the relationship between 
Norway and the European Union in specific policy fields, such as agriculture and fisheries.   
The composition of the Parliament: In a country with a strong tradition of minority governments, the 
composition of the Norwegian Parliament affects governmental positions on European 
integration. Indeed, a government that is not sure of having enough support over a splitting EU-
related issue might avoid putting this issue on top of the agenda. This was demonstrated on two 
occasions: under Bondevik I, when the new coalition was mostly opposed to the Schengen 
agreement but acknowledged that a majority of MPs voted in favour during the previous 
legislature; and under Stoltenberg I, when tentative attempts were made by the Labour Party to 
reactivate the membership issue. To a smaller extent as their build-up took many years, the vote 
over the EEA agreement and discussions over participation in the EU Battle Group also confirm 
this trend. Accordingly, the role of the Storting in shaping governmental positions regarding 
European integration cannot be underestimated. 
The composition and type of the government: Norway experienced three different types of government 
throughout the period analysed: minority one-party government; minority coalition government; 
and majority coalition government (see Table 2). Under the three Labour-led minority one-party 
cabinets, the governmental position mostly reflected the party’s views towards European 
integration: pro-membership (Brundtland III and IV) and, following the outcome of the 1994 
referendum, pro-integration through existing agreements and negotiations over closer 
cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy (Jagland and Stoltenberg I). The minority 
coalition governments (Syse, Bondevik I and II), similarly to the only majority coalition 
government (Stoltenberg II), took milder positions towards European integration, due to strong 
opposing views between parties within the coalitions. In those cases, either the government 
opted for a status quo, basing Norway’s relationship with the EU on existing agreements 
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(Bondevik II and Stoltenberg II), or the parties agreed to disagree, putting the raison d’être of the 
coalition at risk. This is, to some extent, a direct consequence of the consensual nature of 
Norwegian politics.   
4. Conclusions 
This paper demonstrated Norway’s strong ties with the European Union, despite not 
being a member. The range of agreements between both parties covers almost each policy areas, 
besides the Economic and Monetary Union, as outlined in Figure 2.  By describing these 
agreements and the evolution of the Norway-EU relationship, this paper also showed how this 
relationship constitutes a relevant example of both internal and external differentiation. 
Furthermore, it offered a brief description of several variables potentially shaping governmental 
positions regarding European integration.  
While the current range of agreements between Norway and the European Union cover 
about 75 per cent of the whole EU legislation and offered the opportunity for Norwegian 
governments to join policy areas of their choice, this particular case of differentiated integration 
raises some major concerns, especially in terms of democratic accountability. Indeed, Norway 
does not have a say in the European decision-making process, and this type of agreement has 
been nicknamed ‘fax democracy’ by Norwegian civil servants (Eliassen and Sitter, 2003). The 
current situation as well as the evolution of the relationship with the European Union since 1994 
did not lead to major divisions within government coalitions, even despite the presence of two 
Eurosceptic parties in the current government coalition. As EU membership became a non-issue 
since 1994 within government coalitions and as such alternative has been rather unpopular for 
the past decades, it can be argued that Norway’s relationship with the European Union is not 
seen as a temporary solution; nevertheless, this does not mean that future Norwegian 
governments will not try to deepen this relationship and seek new bilateral agreements which 
might serve national interests, similarly to other non-member states (e.g. Switzerland).  
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